





The current debate over commercial-bank
lending to less-developed countries (LDCs) has
primarily centered on the question of whether
private banks have extended too much credit to
the group of non-oil exporting developing coun-
tries. Despite the considerable attention given to
the subject in the financial press, the major inter-
national banks by and large dismiss the possibil-
ity of widespread defaults or reschedulings on
developing-country loans as being highly remote.
A more likely scenario, according to the banks, is
that individual countries occasionally may exper-
ience repayment difficulties requiring some refi-
nancing or rescheduling. Most banks, therefore,
believe that the crucial problem is to be able to
detect in advance which countries are likely to
experience repayment problems and when these
difficulties mayarise.
The banking community has recently shown
great interest in the utilization ofanalytical tech-
niques to detect potential default or rescheduling
situations. Relatively little information is cur-
rently available to appraise the various tech-
niques now in use, and, as a result, it is often
difficult for bankers to judge the adequacy of
their own internal rating systems as compared
with those employed by other institutions, public
or private.
The difficulty is illustrated by a recent Ex-
port-Import Bank survey on bank practices in as-
sessing country risk. 1 That study found that a
large percentage of the 37 U.S. banks surveyed
are dissatisfied with their present country-ap-
praisal methods and are actively seeking new
procedures. From the survey responses, though,
it is not possible to determine how much of their
*Economist, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco.
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dissatisfaction relates to their own procedures,
and how much has to do with limitations in the
currentstateoftheartin assessing country risks.
This paper is designed to facilitate appraisal
of existing procedures by comparing techniques
commonly used by commercial banks and offi-
cial institutions, along with techniques that have
been developed in the economic literature. The
scope ofthe paper is limited to only one aspect of
country-risk appraisal-namely, the use of eco-
nomic indicators to rank countries according to
the probability ofdefault. The analysis addresses
the following questions: (i) What are the eco-
nomic causes of debt reschedulings? (2) Which
set of economic indicators does the best job of
distinguishing between rescheduling countries
and non-rescheduling countries? (3) How reli-
able are econometric techniques in predicting
debt reschedulings?
Section I briefly reviews the experience with
LDC debt reschedulings since the late 1950's,
and describes techniques employed by commer-
cial banks and official institutions for assessing
country risk. Section IIcompares two conceptual
approaches used in the analysis ofdebt resched-
ulings. The first approach views reschedulings as
resulting from fluctuations in prices of primary
products which then lead to a rapid accumula-
tion ofexternal debt relative to export earnings.
The second approach treats debt reschedulings
as a monetary phenomenon, in which domestic
inflation and an overvalued exchange rate con-
tribute to increased demand for imports and to
export stagnation, and consequently to a rapid
build-up ofexternal debts. Section III employs a
statistical procedure--discriminant analysis-to
identify the set ofeconomic indicators which best
distinguish rescheduling countries from non-re-
scheduling countries. (A brief discussion of thestatistical procedure is included for interested
readers.) The final section assesses the relevance
ofthe empirical findings to country-risk apprais-
al and the desirability of using statistical proce-
dures for this purpose.
Our analysis suggests the importance of dis-
tinguishing "liquidity" reschedulings from long-
term debt reschedulings. The first type is associ-
ated with a bunching of short-term commercial
credits (typical ofmost Latin American resched-
ulings), and the second type of rescheduling is
identified with long-term debt relief on official
credits (e.g. reschedulings for South Asian coun-
tries and Ghana). In the "liquidity" cases, mone-
tary (and fiscal) factors appear to be at the root
oftheproblem, and the inflation rateturns out to
be the most imporant explanatory variable.
Cases of chronic-debt relief, on the other hand,
appear less amenable to a monetary framework
of analysis, and it is necessary to include the






'Note: Information on debtreschedulings was compiled
from a variety of sources including Bitterman
[6], Cohen [7], Feder-Just [l1J, Frank-Cline
[I2l, IMF [I7J [18], OECD [22J.
countries to postpone payments of their interest
or principal. The total amount of debt service
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Uruguay 1965 N.A. N.A.
Yugoslavia 1965 N.A. N.A.
1972 59 59
Zaire 1976 N.A. N.A.







Commercial banks encounter two types ofre-
payment risk in international-lending operations
which do not arise in domestic-banking oper-
ations. The first type of risk, commonly referred
to as "sovereign risk," occurs when a national
government refuses to permit foreign loans to be
repaid, or when a government seizes bank assets
without adequatecompensation. The second type
of risk, often called "transfer risk," is associated
with foreign borrowers' problems in converting
domestic currencyintoforeign exchange. Credits
extended to foreign borrowers by banks in the
U.S. market or in the Euro-currency market are
typically denominated in U.S. dollars (or in a key
currency), and government foreign-exchange re-
strictions sometimes make it difficult for borrow-
ers to acquire sufficient foreign exchange to
repay their loans.2 Foreign-exchangecontrols are
particularly common in developing countries,
where fixed exchange-rate policies are still
prevalent.
Commercial banks assess both types ofrisk in
their country-risk appraisals. Cases of expropri-
ation oroutright default on bank loans have been
quite rare in the postwar period, however, and
have been confined mostly to Communist take-
overs in Cuba or Southeast Asia. The more com-
mon case has been the formal restructuring or re-
financing of external-debt obligations in the
wake of foreign-exchange crises. Restructuring
has usually involved a stretching of principal
payments on a previous credit, while refinancing
has involved new credits.
Close to 40 such instances have occurred since
1956, involving about a dozen developing coun-
tries which formally negotiated with creditor
20which roughly $1.3 billion constituted debt owed
to theV.S. government or to U.S. nationals (Ta-
blet). Howiver, the economic cost of debt re-
schedulings-measured as the difference be-
tween the present discounted value ofthe repay-
ments stream before and after rescheduling-
was considerablysmaller.3
Most multilateral debt reschedulings have ei-
therinvolved suppliers' credits (which frequently
carry government guarantees) or official credits.
Many of the Latin American reschedulings, for
example, have involved short-and medium-term
commercial debt, so that negotiations were ar-
ranged through ad hoc meetings ofmajor private
creditors (the so-called "Paris Club" or "Hague
Club" meetings). Debt-relief negotiations for
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey,
on the other hand, have been arranged through
government consortia which were responsible for
coordinating flows of financial assistance to
those countries. Private debts usually have not
been rescheduled in these contexts, in part be-
cause the amounts involved were relatively small
compared with official claims.
LDC workouts of debt to private bank credi-
tors have been much more infrequent and have
tended to take the form of refinancing, rather
than rescheduling ofexisting debt. The principal
cases in earlier years involved Argentina and
Brazil (early 1960's), Peru (1965), and the Phil-
ippines (1970).4 Because of rapid expansion in
international lending, however, banks since 1975
have become even more heavily engaged in nego-
tiations with developing countries, as in the re-
cent negotiations with the governments ofChile
and Zaireon debt-reliefissues. In additions, they
have provided balance-of-payments financing for
Argentina and Peru to ease potential debt prob-
lems of these countries. In this situation, banks
and regulators alike have become concerned
about the need to improve methods for assessing
individual country risks.
Methodsfor assessing risk
Country appraisal can come into play at two
different stages. One phase involves the approval
ofindividual credits, and thus requires a report
by the bank's economics department on the bor-
rowing country's general political and economic
situation. The second phase involves the setting
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ofcountry targets or limits, for the use of bank
management in overseeing the bank's interna-
tional portfolio. The latter process involves mak-
ing country comparisons about the risk ofnon-
repayment, and so subjective judgments play an
importantrole.
Most banks are reluctant to assign formal
credit ratings to individual countries when set-
ting country guidelines. In the Eximbanksurvey,
for example, only about a fourth of the banks
surveyed (8 out of 37) translated their country
evaluations into a country rating (usually with a
five-grade letter system A to E). Five of the
banks which rated countries utilized a weighted
checklist system, with economic and political in-
dicators being used to measurea country's repay-
ment prospects. The summary score, or country
rating, in each case was obtained by assigning
weights to individual indicators and then sum-
ming thevalueofindividual indicators.
The checklist approach can be criticized for
failing to provide a conceptual framework for se-
lecting individual indicators, and also for its arbi-
trary selection of weights. However, statistical
procedures are currently being developed to cir-
cumvent some ofthese problems, by such agen-
cies as the V.S. Treasury Department and the
U.S. Export-Import Bank. Theirstatistical debt-
monitoring systems use a single predictive equa-
tion, based on information about past debt re-
schedulings, to screen "high risk" countries from
those with low probabilities of rescheduling.
(The methodology underlying the Treasury and
Eximbank systems is described in Section III.)
Countries singled out as possible rescheduling
candidates are then subjected to in-depth eco-
nomic and political analyses.
The econometric approach provides a means
for identifying statistically significant variables
and for assigning weights which are not com-
pletely subjective. From a commercial-bank
standpoint, though, the central issue is whether
econometric techniques provide a more reliable
means of detecting defaults or debt reschedul-
ings than present procedures. A direct compari-
son of the two approaches is not possible, since
banks which make country ratings do not public-
ly test their rankings against experience. Pub-
lished studies which employ econometric
techniques, on the other hand, report low errorrates in explaining past reschedulings, although
they have beenfar less successful in anticipating
reschedulings than in explaining most
reschedulings.5
The problems can be traced to the conceptual
framework used to explain debt reschedulings
(Section H) and to methodological difficulties
encountered in applying statistical proceduresto
a small sample of rescheduling countries (Sec-
tion III).
II. Conceptual Approaches toDebt RescheduUngs
Part of the difficulty faced by commercial
banks and regulatory agencies in assessing risks
can be traced to the absence of a well-developed
conceptual framework for analyzing debt prob-
lems of developing countries. Economic models
of"optimal" foreign borrowing largely have been
concerned with the effect of foreign borrowing
on economic growth and with conditions neces-
sarytoensure an efficient allocation ofresources
over time.6 These studies generally conclude that
repayment ofexternal debt is not a problem, pro-
vided that the rate of return on domestic invest-
ment equals or exceeds the cost of foreign
borrowing.7 Such models, however, do not allow
for the fact that foreign borrowing must be re-
paid in foreign exchange, and that foreign-ex-
change receipts may be temporarily scarce.
Second, they typically assume that domestic and
international capital markets are perfectly com-
petitive-assumptionswhich are highly unrealis-
tic for most developing countries.
The two approaches presented in this section
explicitly deal with the foreign-exchange prob-
lems which surround most debt reschedulings.
The debt-service approach traces the LDC's for-
eign-exchange problems to their heavy reliance
on exports of primary products and to the high
volatility ofthese products on world markets. Fi-
nancial ratios derived from individual balance-
of-payments components hence are used to mea-
sure a country's ability to service its external
debt in the event ofa shortfall ofexport receipts.
The monetary approach, on the other hand, is
primarily concerned with the overall determina-
tion ofa country's balance ofpayments, and thus
focuses attention on that country's monetary-fis-
cal policy and exchange-rate policy. From this
perspective, the underlying causes of debt re-
schedulings are internally, rather than external-
ly, generated.
Debt-service approach
The analytic approach used in most statistical
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debt-filonitoring systems is based on the finan-
cial-ratioanalysispioneered by Avramovic and
associates at the World Bank [3]. The approach
views reschedulings as a problem ofexternaldebt
management, and thus focuses attention on the
determinants ofa country's "debt-service capac-
ity". We areconcerned herewith that approach's
underlying assumptions and their implications
for the analysis ofLDC debt problems.
In the Avramovic study, one type of debt
problem involves the near-term bunching of
debt-service payments, while a second involves
debt rescheduling over a longer time interval.8
The Latin American reschedulings typified the
first type of problem: debt-service payments on
short- and medium-term commercial debt were
rescheduled over a fairly short time span-e.g.,
one to five years. But in the case ofthe consortia
creditors to Ghana, India, Indonesia, and Paki-
stan, long-term official lending formed a signifi-
cant portion of debt-service payments. In these
cases, the reschedulings covered such a long
time-span-up to 30 years in the case ofIndone-
sia-that they had a noticeable impact on debt-
service burdens.
Avramovic analyzes the short-run debt prob-
lem as ifthe developing country were a firm fac-
ing a cash-flow or liquidity squeeze. The liquidity
problem in this case reflects a temporary short-
fall in foreign-exchange receipts, brought about
by an exogenous decline in the world price ofthe
LDC'sprincipal export product. Under these cir-
cumstances, the country can try to cover pay-
ments abroad by expanding its export volume, by
curtailing imports, by further borrowing or by
drawing down foreign-exchange reserves. Avra-
movic's analysis, however, assumes that most
LDC's cannot expand export proceeds easily in
the short run, and that they cannot easily "roll-
over" debt by borrowing from private capital
markets. Under these assumptions, a developing
country has only two viable options available inthe short run-namely, to draw down reserves
(including drawings from the International
Monetary Fund) orto reduce its importvolume.
The Avramovic approach attempts to mea-
sure a country's ability to withstand an export
shortfall (or a situation ofcapital flight) by con-
structing financial ratios from individual bal-
ance-of-payments components. The principal
measure of "reserve adequacy," for example, is
the ratio of foreign-exchange reserves to annual
imports ofgoods and services. The higher the ra-
tio, the better equipped the country is to cover
imports by temporarily drawing down foreign-
exchange reserves.
The traditional indicator of debt-service ca-
pacity, on the other hand, is the debt-service ra-
tio--theproportion offoreign-exchange earnings
on current account (exports of goods and serv-
ices) absorbed by interest payments and amorti-
zation on external debt. Those analysts using this
indicator do so because debt-service payments
represent contractually fixed obligations which
cannot be easily adjusted; hence, a higher ratio
implies a larger relative burden on import reduc-
tion for a given shortfall in export receipts. The
reasoning behind this traditional indicator is that
there is a limit on a country's ability to tolerate a
reduction in its import volume.9
One of the principal conclusions of the Avra-
movic study is that the debt-service ratio is a rel-
evant indicator of potential "cash squeeze"
problems associated with foreign-exchange cri-
ses, but that it is less useful for analyzing debt
problems ofa long-run nature. The reason is that
domestic savings rates normally rise during the
process of economic development, in which case
foreign-borrowing requirements needed to sus-
tain a given target growth rate will diminish
through time. A country's debt-service ratio thus
will tend to rise in the early stages of develop-
ment, when domestic saving rates are low, but
will tend to level off or decline with the later rise
indomestic savings. The ability to repay external
debt over the long run, therefore, hinges on the
difference between the marginal savings rate and
the initial savings rate, as well as on the relation-
ship between the rate of return on investment
and thecost offoreign borrowing. 10
Theusefulness ofthe debt-service approach as
an analytical tool hinges critically on the exis-
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tence of assumed balance-of-payments rigidities
and on the nature of foreign-exchange bottle-
necks. In Avramovic's analysis, the foreign-ex-
change constraint reflects two factors: (I)
limited possibilities for short-run expansion for
export production, and (2)inelasticdemand for a
country's major export product. It is assumed
that if a country attempts to expand its export
volume by increasing export production or by re-
ducing domestic consumption, the increased ex-
port volume will lead to a deterioration in the
country's terms of trade; so that export receipts
are not increased." But ifthe "small-country as-
sumption" is applicable-if the country's share
of the world market is so small as to leave the
world price unaffected-the foreign-exchange
bottleneck disappears. That is, the country can
increase its export volume (and its export re-
ceipts) through increased domestic savings or
through expanded production.
The assumption of limited (or zero) capital
mobility is also critical to the analysis. Ifa coun-
try is able to borrow from world capital markets
(including commercial banks) to cover a tempo-
rary shortage of foreign exchange, the concepts
of "reserve adequacy" or "debt service capacity"
become much more difficult to define. Under
these circumstances, it is not the country's lack
offoreign-exchange reserves or the country's ex-
port earnings per se which are important, but
rather the country's ability to acquire foreign ex-
change. 12 In this case, the country must decide
whether the cost of foreign borrowing exceeds
the cost of adjusting to an export shortfall
through import reductions-i.e., profitability
considerations are relevant even in the short run.
The main limitation of the approach, how-
ever, is that it focuses on the events immediately
surrounding a rescheduling, rather than on the
underlying causes. It provides few clues to ex-
plain why countries borrow heavily, and it allows
littlescope for d6mestic policies to influence for-
eign borrowings or repayment prospects. Avra-
movie's analysis, for example, completely ignores
the role which the domestic price level, the ex-
change rate, and interest rates play in the process
of balance-of-payments adjustment. The key
variables-the debt-service ratio, the reserves-
import ratio, the export growth rate, or the do-
mestic savings rate-are either exogenous orstructurally determined. As a result, the scope
for balance-of-payments adjustment appears
quitelimited.
Monetary approach
The alternative approach uses a monetary
framework of analysis to study the problem of
debt-reschedulings. The monetary approach
(like thedebt-service approach) treats reschedul-
ings as consequences of foreign-exchange short-
ages. However, it is primarilyconcerned with the
overall determination of the balance of pay-
ments, rather than with individual balance-of-
payments components. The scarcity of foreign
exchange in this case results from: (I) rapid
money-supply expansion (associated with the fi-
nancing of fiscal deficits) and consequent in-
crease in domestic inflationary pressures, and (2)
maintenance of an overvalued fixed exchange
rate. From this perspective, the underlying
causes ofdebt reschedulings are rooted in domes-
tic economic policies.
An analysis of this monetary framework in-
volves: (1) the effects of domestic inflation and
an overvalued exchange rate on the supply and
demand for foreign funds, and (2) the implica-
tions of exchange-rate flexibility for debt re-
schedulings. Consider first the case ofa develop-
ing country which maintains a fixed exchange
rate and which suffers from a higher inflation
ratethantherest ofthe world.
Inflation can influence thedemand for foreign
funds in such a case through its adverse impact
on the trade accounts. That is, inflation would
tend to cause export demand to fall and import
demand to rise, and the growing trade deficit, in
turn, would increase trade-financing require-
ments. A second type of inflation impact, noted
by Friedrich Lutz [19], concerns the effect ofan
over-valued exchange rate on thecost ofborrow-
ing funds from abroad. Lutz's analysis assumes
thatnominal interest rates in thedomestic econo-
my (id) and abroad (if) reflect the real rate of
return on capital (r) and the expected inflation
rate (p):
id = rd + Pd, and (1)
if= rf+ Pf .
In financing domestic investment, borrowers
compare the real cost ofborrowing in the domes-
tic capital market (rd) with the real cost of bor-
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rowingforeign currencyfrom abroad (r,):
r'=if- Pd+e, (2)
where:e= expected appreciation offoreign
currency.
Real borrowing costs in the two markets (and
real rates of return on capital in the two coun-
tries) will be equated- only if the expected ex-
change-rate change is equal to the expected
inflation-ratedifferentialat homeandabroad:
(3)
If investors believe authorities can maintain a
fixed exchange rate temporarily (despite a high-
erdomesticrateofinflation), incentives will exist
to borrow more heavily from abroad, since real
borrowing costs are then perceived to be lower in
the foreign market than in the domestic
market.13
Amore common situation, however, is one in
which authorities impose interest-rate ceilings to
keep domestic borrowing costs low. Such a policy
tends to lower domestic saving and to ration po-
tential borrowers out of the domestic market.
The imposition of interest ceilings, therefore,
may also create incentives resulting in increased
demand for foreign funds.
The amount of foreign borrowing, however,
also depends on lenders' expectations about re-
payment prospects. In a highly competitive mar-
ket, such as the Eurocurrency market, loans to
developing countries include an interest premi-
um-the spread over the London inter-bank of-
fer rate-which reflects the higher risk of
repayment. An increased demand for foreign
funds associated with an over-valued exchange
rate, therefore, need not result in an increased
volume of foreign borrowing-provided that
there is a contraction (leftward shift) in the sup-
ply schedule of foreign funds to offset that in-
creaseddemand.
While economic theory provides no clear-cut
reasons for expecting domestic inflation to lead
to an increased volume offoreign borrowing, the
effect may not be completely neutral, judging
from the experience of those LDC's which have
rescheduled suppliers' credits. For instance, most
oftheLatinAmericancountriesofthis type were
able to obtain ample suppliers' credits (usually
government-guaranteed) in the early stages of
inflation, but fewer such credits as the inflation
progressed. In these cases, domestic inflation re-suited in rapid growth ofdebt-service payments
in the early stages ofinflation, but then in subse-
quentexport stagnation, which contributed to
rising debt-serviceratios.
Thus far, we have assumed that authorities in
developing countries maintain fixed exchange
rates. ActuaUy, most LDC's today continue to
peg their exchange rates to some key currency,
although a growing number ofthem have experi-
mented with some form of exchange-rate flexi-
bility in recent years. Under a freely-floating
exchange rate, a country cannot experience a
shortageofforeign exchange, since thereis no of-
ficial intervention in the foreign-exchange mar-
ket. The absence of a "foreign-exchange
problem," however, does not imply a smaller bur-
den oftransferring real resources abroad to ser-
vice external debt. Rather, exchange-rate
flexibility is relevant to debt reschedulings be-
cause exchange-rate movements are part of the
overall adjustment process, whether the re-
source-transfer problem is "real" or monetary.
Currencydepreciation resulting from a price de-
cline for some major export product, for exam-
ple, win create incentives towards increased
export production. Similarly, depreciation re-
sulting from domestic inflation will offset the ad-
verse effects ofinflation on the trade accounts. In
this sense, exchange-rate flexibility can help re-
duce the necessity for debt rescheduling. There-
fore, one would probably expect fewer debt
reschedulings under flexible exchange rates, al-
though not necessarilyso in everycase.
inflation and debtrescheduling
A clear relationship between inflation and
debt rescheduling is apparent for the 1960-76 pe-
riod (Table 2).15 Altogether, 70 percent of the
countries with long-term inflation rates above 10
percent (measured by wholesale prices) resche-
duled their debts at some time during that peri-
od. Moreover, aU six countries in the "high
inflation" group had to reschedule at least once
between 1960and 1976.
Other data suggest the important contribu-
III. Empirical Evidence on Debt Reschedulings
This section presents empirical evidence on proach is difficult to use in any "early-warning"
the determinants of debt rescheduling, with em- system, at least pardy because World Bank data
phasis on the characteristics distinguishing those on externaldebtareavailableonly aftera two- or
countries whichhave rescheduled theirdebtfrom three-yearlag for most countries. TheU.S. Trea-
those which have not-previous empirical stud- sury Department actuaUy discontinued use ofits
ies have largely concentrated on variables sug- debt-monitoring system because of the problem
gested in the Avramovic study. The statistical ofobtaining up-to-date, accurate information on
results confirm that reschedulings are associated LDCexternaldebt.
with a high debt-service ratio and a bunching of With respect to the monetary approach, how-
external-debt obligations, but there is disagree- ever, inflation rates and exchange rates are gen-
ment about the importance of other economic eraUy available with relatively short time lags.
variables. Hence, an indicator system relying on the mone-
Frank and Cline [12] used discriminant anal- tary approach is more likely than one based on
ysis to investigate the importanceofeight indica- debt information to detect likely candidates for
tors for the period 1960-68. They found only debt rescheduling. To date, however, there has
three variables to be important: the debt-service been litde empirical work on the relationship be-
ratio, the debt-amortization ratio, and the ratio tween monetary variables and debt reschedul-
ofimports to reserves. Feder and Just [11], using ings, so this study attempts to establish whether
a similar set ofexplanatory variables, applied 10- such a relationship exists.
git analysis to explain reschedulings during the
1965-72 period. Their results showed the impor-
tance of the three variables identified by Frank
and Cline, but three other indicators as well-
the export growth rate, the level ofper capita in-
come, and the ratioofcapital inflows to debt-ser-
vice payments.
Both studies report low error rates in identify-
ing past reschedulings. 14 Nonetheless, questions
arise about theavailability ofdata for testing the
two basic (debt-service and monetary) ap-
proaches. For example, the debt-service ap-
25tionofcurrencyovervatuation.......-as well.as.infla-
tion.......-tp •. balance-of-payments difficulties prior
todebtrescn.edulings(Table 3). In every case
cited, except EgyptandTurkey, a majorcurren~
cydevaluation was undertakenaroundtheperiod
when<i~bt.\Vas rescheduled. Yet with frequent
exchange-rate adjustments, .countries such as
Colpmbia, Israel, Korea, Chile (1965-70 and
1975-76) and Brazil (1965-76) have successfully
avpided.repaYment difficulties despite theirrela-
tively high inflation. These countries at times
have pursued "craWling peg" policies, where ex-
change-rate changes are linked .to the difference
between.their own inflation rate and.those of
their principal trading partners.Theirexperience
suggests that increased exchange-rate flexibility
may help mitigate.the adverse effects ofinflation
on export and import performance, on borrowing
incentives, and thus on debt reschedulings.
Exchange-rate depreciation, however, may
not always be successful in avoiding reschedul-
ing. Four ofthe.five countries which experienced
very high inflation, for example, allowed the ex-
change ratetodepreciate on more than one occa-
sion in the period preceding rescheduling. The
depreciation, however, was insufficientin each
case to offset the adverse effects of sustain.ed
high inflation on the tradeaccount.
Application ofdiscriminant analysis
Theevi<iencepresented above suggests that
monetaryfactors maybe important for under-
standing previous debt renegotiations. The ques-
tionstiILremains, however, as to whether
indicatprsutilized in the monetary approach can
perfprm as well or better than those utilized in
the debt-service approach. To answer thisques-
tion we applied a statistical technique (discrimi-
nantanalysis) to data on two groups of
developing countries-those which rescheduled
their debt at least once in the 1960-76 period,
and those which did not. The statistical proce-
dure is the same as that employed in the Frank-
Cline study and in the debt-monitoring systems
used by the U.S. Treasury Department and the
U.s.Export-Import Bank.
Discriminant analysis16 provides a rule (or dis-
criminant function) for classifying observations
Table 2







































































































1 Figures in parentheses represent annual compound (WPI) inflation rates over the period 1960-1975. Asterisks denote debt
reschedulings in the period 1960-76. (See Table I). Data from International FinancialStatistics.
2 U.S. annual compound WPI inflation rateis 4.2% for 1960-75.
26(e.g., countries) into two or more groups (e.g.,
"rescheduling country" vs. "non-rescheduling
country"). The rule is selected so as to minimize
theexpectedcostofmaking two types oferrors in
classifying observations. In our analysis, Type I
erroroccurs when a rescheduling country is clas-
sifieda.sanon-rescheduling country, andType II
errorresults when a non-rescheduling country is
classified as a rescheduling country.
Suppose, for example, that the only difference
between rescheduling countries and non-re-
scheduling countries is that the inflation rate is
higheron average in the first group than in the
second group. Under these circumstances a sim-
ple way to classify countries would be to select
some cut-offinflation rate, say 10 percent, and to
categorize countries with inflation rates above
this valueinthe rescheduling group, and tocate-
gorizecountrieswith lower inflation rates in the
non-rescheduling grou.p. Applying the "10 per-





(14countries) (classified (Type 1errorrate)
correctly)
Non- 13% 87%
Rescheduling group (Type 11 (Classified
(30countries) errorrate) correctly)
Table 3
DebtReschedulings and Exchange Rate Devaluations1
3 year 3 year
Debt CPllnflation Money-Supply(M,) ExchangeRate
Reschedulings Rate(OAl) GrowthRate (0Al) Devaluation
VeryHigh Inflation Group
Argentina 1962 23.3 9.9 1962
1965 24.7 31.1 1964,1965
Brazil 1961 31.6 43.9 1961
1964 69.7 70.5 1962-65
Chile 1965 37.3 48.8 1962-65
1974 43.2 110.3 1972-76
Indonesia 1965 173.8 386.2 1966-68
1970 185.0 73.3 1970
Uruguay 1965 40.3 58.8 1965
Zaire 1976 24.6 25.5 1976
High InflationGroup
Ghana 1966 12.6 14.0 1967
1974 16.0 29.9 none
Peru 1968 12.6 14.4 1967
Philippines 1970 6.2 10.9 1970
Yugoslavia 1965 16.3 16.1 1965
1972 11.4 15.8 1971
MiddleorLow inflationGroups
India 1968 9.4 7.8 1966
1973 8.8 14.5 1972
Paldstan 1971 5.0 14.3 1971
Egypt 1966 9.2 10.1 none
Turkey 1965 3.3 14.5 none
1972 11.4 21.6 none , Data from International Financial Statistics.
27Thus, four of fourteen countries (29 percent)
which rescheduled their debt had long-term in-
flation rates less than 10 percent, so that use ofa
10.percent cut-offvalue caused those four to be
classified incorrectly (Type I error). Four ofthe
thirty countries (13 percent) which did not re-
schedule, on the other hand, had a long-term in-
flation rateabove 10 percent, resulting in Type II
error.
The same principle applies to a situation in
which there area number ofvariables which dif-
ferentiate thetwo groups. Inthis case, a discrimi-
nant "score" (orcompositevariable) is computed
as.a weighted average ofthe individual variables
for purposes of classifying individual observa-
tions. The weights of the composite variable are
selected so as to maximize the difference in mean
values for the two groups, given the specified set
ofvariables.
The ability to classify countries correctly de-
pends on how close the group means are relative
to the group dispersions. This point is illustrated
in Figures la and 1b, which assume normal
"bell-shaped" distributions for the two-group
case and a cutoffinflation value, c. The probabil-
ity ofType II error (Le., ofmisclassifying an ob-
servation from the nonrescheduling group) with
a value ofp> c ( = 10 percent), thus, is the
shaded area under the bell-shaped function for
group I to the right ofc, while the probability of
misclassifying an observation from group 2
(Type I error) is the shaded area to the left of c
under the density function for group 2. Error
rates in classifying observations (Le., the per-
centage of observations misclassified) will be
much greater when there is considerable group
overlap (Figure la) than if there is only a small
degree ofgroup overlap (Figure 1b). Differences
in group means, therefore, do not always guaran-
tee that the rules will yield a useful classification
schemein which theerrorsaresmall.
Finally, the proportion ofType I and Type II
errors depends on the particular cutoff point se-
lected for classifying countries. Moving the cut-
offvalue, c, to the right in Figure 1, for example,
increasesthe probability ofType I error and re-
duces the probability ofType II error, while the
opposite is true ifthe cutoffvalue is moved to the
left.Selectionofthe cutoffpoint hinges on an as-
sessmentofthe cost ofmaking each type oferror
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(whichmayentail.a subjectivejudgment) and on
the frequency of reschedulings relative to non-
reschedulings. 17
MethodologicalIssues
l'hemain •• problem encountered in applying
discriminant analysis (or other statistical proce-
dures)to debt-rescheduling data arises from the
small number ofobervations ofthis type. Pooled
time series.and cross-section data are typically
usedtoincrease the number ofrescheduling ob-
servations, and. this procedure is adopted here.
Each observation thus corresponds to a country
and a year. The Argentine multilateral resched-
ulingof 1962, for example, is treated as a sepa-
rate observation from the Argentine reschedul-
ingof1965.
The procedure of pooling time series and
cross-section data leads to further complications,
however, which must be considered in interpret-
ing our results (and those of other published
studies):
1. The number of rescheduling cases (24) is
still small in comparison with the non-reschedul-
ing cases (442).18 Plots of variables for the re-
scheduling group, moreover, suggest that the
data are not normally distributed. Thus, one of
the theoretical assumptions underlying discrimi-
nantanalysis is violated.19
2. The individual observations are "serially
correlated." A country which exhibits a high (or
low) inflation rate or debt-service ratio in one
year, for instance, tends toexhibit the samechar-
acteristic in other years. Thiswill affect the error
rates, since a country which is misclassified (or
correctly classified) in one year will tend to be
misclassified (or correctly classified) in other
years.20
3. A problem arises with countries which
have rescheduled debt more than once. Ghana
and India, for example, have had debt resched-
uled in a number of years since 1966 and 1968,
respectively, in the process of coordinating aid
flows to those countries. Thus, do those resched-
ulings represent "new events" or extensions of
the original reschedulings?21 A question also
arises regarding the treatment ofobservations of
rescheduling countries in non-rescheduling
years. The results reported here delete such ob-
servation, since we are primarily interested inidentifying characteristics which distinguish re-
scheduling from non-rescheduling countries,
rather than identifying the times of
rescheduling.22
4. The implicit assumption is that the fac-
torscontributing to reschedulings are the same in
one period as in other periods-i.e., there are no
"structural" changes affecting reschedulings (or
distributions) during the sample period. It is dif-
ficulttotest this proposition becauseofthe limit-
ednumber of reschedulings, although the
discriminant rule appears to explain recent cases
as well as earliercases.
Several further pitfalls are often encountered
in interpreting results from discriminant analy-
sis.•One of the.most widely misunderstood as-
pects relates to the problem of determining the
importance of individual variables. Unlike the
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Rate {p}coefficients. in the linear-regression model, the
discriminant-function coefficients are not
unique.(However, the ratios ofthose coefficients
are unique.) Consequently, no test can be made
for< the absolute importance of a particular vari-
ai:l1e.(i.e., settinga p<.irticular coefficient equal to
zeroorto some other value), although a number
ofrnethodshave been proposed to determine the
relative importanceofindividual variables.23
Empiricalresults
Two sets ofexplanatory variables were used to
differentiate rescheduling and non-rescheduling
cases in the 1960-75 period. The first set includ-
ed variables identified in previous empirical stud-
ies: (1) the debt-service ratio; (2) the reserve-
import ratio; (3) the export growth rate (in U.S.
dollars); (4) the growth rate ofreal GNPand (5)
the level of per capita GNP (in 1970 U.S. dol-
lars). The second set contained variables suggest-
ed by the monetary approach, and also (6) the
(consumer-price) inflation rate; (7) the growth
rate ofthe Ml money supply; and (8) a measure
of relative purchasing-power parity (the differ-
ence between the domestic and U.S. inflation
rates, on a wholesale-price basis, less the rate of
domestic currency depreciation vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar). All explanatory variables were expressed
as three-year annual averages, with the explana-
tory variables lagging the dependent variable an
average ofone year-e.g., with the 1960-62 aver-
age inflation rate distinguishing rescheduling
and non-rescheduling cases in 1962. The debt-
service ratio was also adjusted to include sched-
uled (rather than actual) debt-service
payments.24
A forward step-wise regression procedure was
used to obtain a measure of the relative impor-
tance of each variable, prior to applying the dis-
criminant sub"routine.25 The results suggested
that the inflation rate and the adjusted debt-ser-
vice ratio were the most important explanatory
variables (Table 4). The inflation rate and the
money-supply growth rate were highly correlat-
ed, however, so that the relative importance of
the money-supply variable increased consider-
ably when the inflation rate was excluded. Two
ofthe variables, the reserve-import ratio and the
level ofper capita income, added little in the way
of explanatory power, and thus were omitted
from the discriminant sub-routine.
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The mea.ninfla.tion rate for the rescheduling
gi"OUp wa.snea.l"ly Seven times larger than the
nion-rescheduling group; the money-supply
growth ratewas nearly four times larger, and the
a.djusteddebhserviceratiowas about three times
grea.ter. Thestanda.rd deviation of the inflation
rate a.ndmoney-supply growth rate for the res-
cl'ledulinggroup, however, were also consider-
abiylargerthan for the non-rescheduling group,
owing to theincidence ofhyper-inflation and the
sma.ll sample size. As a result, differences in the
coefficients ()fvariation (i.e., the standard devi-
ation divided by the mean) for the two groups
were much smaller than the differences in group
means.
Tests for equality of the multivariate group
means and variance-covariance matrices indicat-
ed that group differences were statistically sig-
nificant.26 Under these circumstances, the
appropriate rule for classifying countries would
be a quadratic (rather than linear) function. In
most cases tested, however, the linear function
yielded comparable results to the quadratic func-
tion. The linear rule also had the advantage of
being easier to interpret, because of the smaller
numberofterms involved.
Two separate linear functions were obtained:
(I) Inflation RateIncluded
8.72· .21(CPI) - .01(MS) + .04(EX) - .35 (DSA)
+ .03(PP) + .07 (GNP)
(2) Inflation RateExcluded
7.72 - .lO(MS) + .05(EX) - .36(DSA) .05(PP)
+.lI(GNP)
where:
CPI = average annual rate of consumer price inflation
over three-year period
MS average annual rate of M, growth over three-
year period
EX averagleannual rate of growth of exports (in
U.S. dollars) over three-year period
DSA = average debt-service ratio over three-year peri-
od (adjusted to include scheduled debt-service
payments for rescheduling countries)
PP purchasing-power parity (i.e., a three-year aver-
age ofthe difference between the domestic and
the U.S. WPI inflation rates, less the rate of do-
mestic currencydepreciation vis-a-vis the $).
GNP = average annual rate of growth of real output
over three-year period.
The functions were constructed so that themore the negative value, the more likely the Iected. (The cutoffvalue for the results reported
country would be classified in the· rescheduling assUl.nestheexpected cost ofType I error is three
group. The prominence of the inflation·rate in times the expected cost of Type II error.) The
equation 1 (or money-supply growth rate in over~n error rate is not very meaningful, howev-
equation 2) and the adjusted debt-service ratio is er, in view ofthe large difference in sample size
apparent from the weights of these variables in for the two groups ()fcountries. The percentage
the discriminant functions, which corroborates ofrescheduling cases in the sample is roughly 5
the finding from the step-wise regression proce- percent; hence, a rule which classifies aU coun-
dure. In addition, the negativesigns ofthe coeffi- tries as non-rescheduling cases will have an over-
dents of these variables are consistent with the aU error rate of 5 percent. For this reason, it is
hypothesis that the probability of rescheduling importantto examine the incidenceofType I and
increases as theirvalue increases. Type II errors and to see how they vary with the
The percentage of c()untries classified incor- cutoffpoint.
recdy with these functions ranges from 3percent Type I error rates vary from 15 to 54 percent,




Variable Non-Rescheduling Group ReschedulingGroup
Coefficient Coefficient
Standard of Standard of
Mean Deviation Variation' Mean Deviation Variation'
Inflation(CPI) Rate 5.6 5.7 1.02 36.7 48.5 1.32
(23.8)2 (21.5)2 (0.9)2
M, Growth Rate 13.9 8.2 0.59 49.6 78.0 1.57
(33.2)2 (31.2)2 (0.94)2
ExportGrowth Rate 16.3 18.1 1.11 9.7 13.3 1.37
DebtService Ratio 7.6 5.8 0.76 21.1 8.5 0.40
RealGNPPerCapita
Growth Rate 3.7 3.9 1.05 2.3 2.6 1.13
PurchasingPower



























, Standarddeviation + mean
2 These figures are affected by theexperience ofhyper-inflation surrounding the Indonesian reschedulings. Values excluding
data for Indonesia arein parentheses.
• Countrydata arefrom International FinancialStatisticsandfrom IBRD, World Tables.
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Discriminant Analysis Results:



































































































1 Results based on two sets of linear discriminant functions; assuming expected costs of Type I error is three times the
expected costofType II error:
DebtServiceRatioIncluded
8.72 - .21 (CPI) - .01 (MS) + .04 (EX)
- .35 (DSA) + .03 (PP) + .07 (GNP)
DebtServiceRatioExcluded
4.07 - .22 (CPI) - .01 (MS) + .04 (EX)
+ .03 (PP) + .03 (GNP)
32Chart 2
10 Type 2 Error
rectlyclassified(Table 5). Reschedulings in
these countries are associated with high inflation
and rapid money-supply growth, and the dis-
criminantrule assigns a relatively large weight to
thesevariables.These countries also tendto have
high debt-service ratios, but that ratio need not
be included toexplain theirreschedulings.
Reschedulings in South Asian countries, on
the other hand, require some information on the
adjusted debt-service ratio. India and.Pakistan
experienced relatively low inflation rates for the
groupQfrescheduling countries (partly owing to
the use ofextensive price controls), but debt re-
lieUor these countries (and for Ghana) has be-
come a means of supplementing aid flows. The
debt-service ratio, in particular, has been used as
anjndicator ofneed for debt reliefby the consor-
tiaofaid donors.
The results are somewhat paradoxical in the
light ofthe traditional approach taken by Avra-
movie et al. Ontheone hand, thedebt-service ra-
tio is found to be an accurate-but largely
redundant-indicator of those reschedulings as-
sociated with short-run balance ofpayments cri-
ses. On the other hand, the debt-service ratio is
found to be a critical factor explaining those re-
schedulings associated with long-run debt prob-
lems. In the latter cases, the reasons are political
as well as economic.




RELATION OF ERROR RATES TO VALUE OF CUT-OFF POINT
(Linear Discriminant Function)
0'--'----'----'---'----'------'-- Cut-off
-1 0 1 2 Value
(50%) (75%) (90%)
percent to 11 percent (Figure 2). The ability to
classify non-rescheduling cases more precisely
than rescheduling cases reflects the absence ofa
"well-behaved" distribution for the rescheduling
countries-i.e., the variables are highly skewed
andexhibit large variances.
The discriminant rules perform best in ex-
plaining reschedulings in South American coun-
tries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay)
and Indonesia, where 10 out of 12 cases are cor-
IV. Summary andConclusions
This paper has examined two sets ofissues in-
volved in country-risk appraisal-the causes of
pastdebt reschedulings, and the ability to antici-
patefuture reschedulings. Theevidence suggests,
first, that there is a systematic pattern of debt
reschedulings which is amenable to economic
analysis.Reschedulings, in short, are not isolated
or random events, even though their underlying
causes are not thesamefor all countries.
The analysis distinguishes between "liquidity"
reschedulings, which are associated with the
bunching ofshort-term commercial credits, and
other reschedulings, which are identified with
long-term debt reliefon official credits.
Monetary (and.fiscal) factors appear to be
closely involved in the "liquidity" cases. Inflation
andover-valued exchange rates lead to excessive
reliance on foreign borrowing and thence to ex-
port stagnation and over-importing-and gener-
ally to foreign-exchange crises. Cases ofchronic
debt relief, on the otherhand, appear less amena-
ble to a monetary framework ofanalysis. In par-
ticular, it becomes difficult to measure the extent
of over-valuation on the basis of inflation-rate
differentials, because of the LDC's tendency to
resort to price controls, capital controls, ex-
changecontrols, and high tariffbarriers.
Knowledge ofthecauses ofpast reschedulings
does not necessarily imply an ability to anticipate
future reschedulings. The latter is affected by the
difficultyofcorrectly forecasting exogenous var-
iables, by changes in structural parameters ofes-
timating equations, and by problems caused by
the small samples used in analyses of previous
resched:uJings. Even so, statistical procedures
have an advantage over commercial-bank check-
33list·systems because they provide a systematic
m~thodforidentifying variables andfor explicit-
lyconsideringtrade-ofTs.
An understanding of past reschedulings,
moreover, can be useful in delineating what is
important for country-risk appraisal. The analy-
sisin thispa~rsuggests that banks should focus
on theinflation rate (and its determinants) and
thedebt-service ratio as the key economic varia-
bles afTecting a country's borrowings and its abil-
itytorepay.
FOOTNOTES
i = r(so - s')
economic growth. The condition for equi-proportionate growth of
debtand GNP is writtl:in:
where P(1/2) is the probability of assigning an observation to
group l,given it arose from group 2; C1is the cost of misclassify-
ingan ()bservation to gr()up l,given it is from group 2; 11"1 and 11"2
are thea priori probabilities of an observation being drawn from
groups 1and 2respectively.
See Avramovic [31, Malhematical Appendix, pp. 188-192.
11. "Hitherto, the discussion has been in terms of 'domestic'
growth variables, in particular the savings-investment balance. The
savings-investment gap is equal to the foreign exchange gap, by
definition. However,. this is no more than an ex-post accounting
equality. Mon" interesting is the mechanism by which this equality
is bro!1ght about. The. capacity to transfer savings abroad may be
undermined bye deterioration in terms of trade. The foreign ex-
change gap, allowing forthemovement ofexportand import prices,
may be much larger than the savings-investment gap at constant
prices. The quality is restored ex-post, by a reduction in the 'inter-
national value' of domestic savings and, also, by an actual reduc-
tionin thedomeatic savings rate as income growth decelerates
under the impact of the dl:iterioration of the terms of trade." Avra-
movic [31, p. 50.
12. The fact that countries such as Bra~i1, Mexico, and Israel have
ready access to international capital markets helps to explain why
theyareablet()llUCCeaafully sustain high debt-service ratios. in
thelle countries debt can be "rolled-over" much more easilythan in
most othllrdeveloping countries.
13. Thill situation existed in K()rea in the period immlldiately fol-
lowing the financial reforms of 1964-65. For further discussion of
thispoint, see Sargen [231.
14. Feder-Just report overall error rates in classifying countries
(i.e., TYPe land Type II errors as a percent of the total number of
observations) ranging from 2to 5 percent, while Frank-Cline report
errorrllltesbelween 8 and 18 percentoHhe sample.
15. Countries listed in Table 2 coincide with those used in our sta-
tillticlllllllnalysis dillcussed in Section III. Countries were selected
using two criteria: (1) whether they had a debt-service ratio above
5 percent; and (2) whether time series data on key series were
available datingback101980. The main group of developing coun-
tries omiUed fromthellample are African nations.
16.For a dascription of the technique, see Eisenbeis and Avery
[91.
17. The discriminant technique attempts to minimi~e the following
"IOllll" function:
L = Cl . P (1/2) 11"2 + C2 P(211) 11"1,
(so - Kr)
average intereston foreign debt
average and marginal savings rate
incremental capital-output ratio





1. •SeeGoodman [131. The Federal Reserve has also recently con-
duCtedaninformal survey ofbank practices in defining, monitoring,
and controlling foreign lending exposure.
2. ·Sy denominating a loan to an LOC in a key currency, a commer-
cial bitnkcan avoid the risk of exchange rate depreciation of the
LDCcurrency, but notthe risk ofnon-repayment.
3. Estimates of the cost of rescheduling are difficult to obtain
since fairly detailed information on the repayment stream is re-
quired to compute the present discounted values. In case of res-
chedulings of official credits it is customary to compute the "grant
element" of the rescheduling-i.e., the value of the repayment
stream after rescheduling as a fraction of the value of the repay-
ment stream atcommercial interest rates.
4. For purposes of this study, refinancings of individual bank cred-
itsaretreated as a problem ofcreditrisk, rather than as a problem
of country risk. The distinction between refinancings and resche-
dulings in many cases is moot, although technically a refinancing
involvell an extension of new credit as compared to a "stretch-out"
ofan existing credit.
5. Forecasting precision is affected by the ability tc forecast ex·
og&nous variables accurately and by changes in structural param-
eters, aswell asbythe standard errorin the estimating equation.
6. SeeBade [41, Bardhan [51, and McCabe and Sibley [201.
7. Aliber[11 discusses the analogy of the optimum indebtedness of
the firm and that of developing countries. His paper examines
whether bank lending to developing countries constitutes an effi-
cient allocation of the world's resources and whether risk premi-
ums on LOC loans aretoo large relative tothe cost ofrescheduling.
8. Avramovic usesa separate analytic framework to examine each
type of problem. Our discussion is primarily concerned with debt
problems associated with a foreign exchange crisis, rather than
with problems stemming from slow economic growth.
The theoretical underpinnings for separating the two types of
problems are the "two-gap" models of economic development,
which assume that foreign exchange earnings are limited by inelas-
tic export demand, and that technical substitution possibilities be-
tween f()reign and domestically produced capital goods are fixed.
Under these circumatances, the ex-snte condition for trsde bal-
anceand for equality of domestic savings and investment are writ-
ten separately, rather than in the usual fashion, S-I = X-M. The
foreign l:ixC/lange constraint is assumed to be binding in the short
run, \Vhilethesavinga conatraint is binding over the long run. For a
critique ofthe two gapmodels, see Nelson [211.
9. The popularity of the debt-service ratios as a default indicator
datl:isback to the 1930's, when a number of Latin American coun-
tri&a with high debt service ratios (15% or more) defaulted. See
Mrarnovic [31, p.194. Primary producing countries experienced
sharp declines in prices of their export products, increasing their
real dllbtburden; atthe aame time, new credits were not forthcom-
ing.On the othl:ir hand, there are several examples of countries
with high debt-serviceratios which have not experienced debt diffi-
CUlties. These include Australia and Canada during the 1930's
(with investment service-export earnings ratio above 30 percent)
and Mexico, Bra~iI, and Israel in recent years.
10. Avramovic examines the properties of a model of foreign bor-
rowing which assumes a Harrod-Oomar (fixed coefficient) model of
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18. The countries in the sample are listed in Table 2. Most of the
data cover the period 1960-1975. However, three countries which
experienced debt difficulties in 1976 (Argentina, Peru, and Zaire)
were also included as rescheduling cases. Information on resche-
duling was obtained from Bitterman [6], IMF [17] [18] and OECD
[22].
19. Non-normality does not necessarily imply that the results are
invalid, but it may affect the error rate in ways that are not quantifi-
able. 'tVa are presently experimenting with transformations that
morecloselyapproximatea normal distribution.
20. The presence of serial correlation means that the number of
independent observations is considerably smaller than the total
number of observations. At present, there are no procedures to
correct for serial correlation using discriminant analysis as there
are with regression analysis. To get around the problem, one can
use each country in the 1960-76 period as one observation, but the
numberof rescheduling casesismuch smaller.
21. Reschedulings for India in 1973 and Ghana in 1974 have been
treated as new events, because major decisions were reached on
continuing long·term debt relieftothese countries.
22. This procedure is used by Feder and Just in their study. If one
isInterested in identifying the year that a rescheduling occurs, one
can follow the procedure of treating the observations as "hold·
outs" and seeing how they are classified by the discriminant rule.
Alternatively, one may choose to assign observations to three
groups, instead of two.
23. SeeEisenbeis [lO],pp. 13-14.
24. The differences in the adjusted debt service ratios and those
reported by the IBRD (based on actual repayments) are especially
large for Chile (1974), Ghana (1966), and Turkey (1966), (1971).
Our revisions are based on information contained in Bitterman [6],
IMF[17] [18], OECD [22].
25. See Eisenbeis and Avery [9], pp. 70-75, for a discussion ofthe
procedure.
26. The test of quality of the dispersion matrix between.the reo
scheduling and non'rescheduling groups yields an F21 .5646 statis-
tic of 63.7, which is statistically significant (i.e. the variances for
the two groups are unequal). Similarly, the test for equality of group
means (based on the Mahalanobic D2 1 yields an F6,459 statistic
of 43.5. The test, however, assures the dispersion matrices are
equal; hence, the results may not be fully accurate.
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